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I.

The federal perspective on groundwater law
has undergone a significant evolution
during the past twelve months.
A.

The federal judiciary has, after years
of anticipation by water lawyers,
injected federal constitutional limits
on state decisions involving
interstate allocation of groundwater
supplies.
1.

In Sporhase, et al. v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas, No. 81-613
(decided July 2, 1982), the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down
a Nebraska law which restricted
the export of groundwater from
the state. The Court held it
was an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce in violation
of the Commerce Clause of the
Federal Constitution.

2.

In City of El Paso, et al. v.
Reynolds, et al., No. 80-730HB
(Jan. 17, 1983), the federal
district court for the District
of New Mexico struck down a set
of New Mexico laws which precluded the use of New Mexico
groundwater by the City of El
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Paso in Texas. The court held
that the laws also violated the
Commerce Clause.
B.

In the wake of the Sporhase and El
Paso rulings, there has been considerable congressional activity,
including several proposals for
federal legislation to respond to the
rulings. Much of this activity has
occurred in the context of pending
legislation to grant the power of
eminent domain to coal slurry pipeline companies.

C.

The executive branch of the federal
government, including the Department
of Justice, has spent considerable
effort analyzing both the recent bills
and providing counsel to Congress in
this area.

The Reagan Administration joins those who
are firmly committed to maintaining the
historic primacy of state law in the area
of the allocation of waters, including
groundwaters. The recent court decisions
have rekindled the debate regarding how
state primacy" is best achieved.
A.

At the outset, development of appropriate federal perspective on recent
-2-

developments requires careful review
and assessment of Sporhase and El Paso.
1.

In striking down Nebraska's reciprocity requirement, the Sporhase
Court addressed three basic
issues (copy of opinion attached).
a.

Whether groundwater is an
article of commerce and
therefore, subject to congressional regulation: The
Court answered this in the
affirmative, discarding the
theory that state "ownership" defeated congressional
power. The Court stressed
the multi-state character -both physical and economic
-- of groundwater.

b.

Whether the Nebraska
restrictions on the interstate transportation of
groundwater imposes an
impermissible burden on
Commerce: The Court agreed
that conservation was a
legitimate important purpose
but could not justify
Nebraska's reciprocity
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requirement which, due to
Colorado's export ban,
prohibited export to
Colorado, because there was
no "close fit" between the
requirement and conservation.
The Court held that other
facially-discriminatory
conservation requirements
in Nebraska law were valid.
c. Whether Congress has granted
the states permission to
engage in groundwater regulation that would otherwise
be impermissible: The Court
held that neither specific
interstate compacts nor
federal statutes deferring
to state water law revealed
the explicit congressional
intent necessary to remove
Commerce Clause constraints.
2.

In City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
the federal district court
invalidated New Mexico's
statutory constitutional prohibitions on the interstate transportation of groundwater which
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blocked use of New Mexico ground-

r

water by El Paso, Texas (copy
of opinion attached).
a.

The court rejected New
Mexico's threshold defense
that the Rio Grande
Interstate Compact, not the
challenged laws, blocked
the use of the groundwater
by El Paso. That Compact,
according to the court,
did not address the issue
and, in any event, New

r

Mexico had not established
that the prohibition was
necessary for adherence
to the Compact.
b.

The court reasoned that New
Mexico's restrictions
amounted to impermissible
burdens because they were
facially discriminatory,
yet not justified in terms
of needs for "human survival" (i.e., public health
and safety), but only

P^

"public welfare" needs.
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c.

The court also held that
even if the expressed purpose of the restriction was
public health and safety,
the New Mexico laws were
not sufficiently tailored
to serve that purpose
because there were no
restrictions on in-state
use.

d.

Finally, the court ruled
that New Mexico could not
justify its ban on the
grounds (explicitly approved
by Sporhase Court) that it
was an arid state where
intrastate transfer was
feasible regardless of distance. The court concluded
no shortage existed in New
Mexico and no concrete plans
for intrastate transportation facilities were evident.

B. Although Sporhase and El Paso are very
significant rulings, to those of us
committed to state determination of
water allocation, it is not clear,
upon review, how serious a threat
they present to state primacy.
-6-

1.

These decisions were not totally
unexpected. Water lawyers, some
dreading, others demanding, but
all anticipating, such a ruling
for years.

2.

It is not clear how significant
a problem Sporhase presents
because it left states with
considerable discretion and
power over waters.
a.

Court rejected state ownership as legal fiction but
that holding was consistent
with other recent decisions
rejecting theories of
ownership" of other
natural resources.

b.

Court recognized that state
control of groundwaters
must be far-reaching because:
i.

state regulation of
the use of water is at
the core of its police
power.

-7-

states have developed

a legal expectation,
fostered by congressional legislation
and judicial decrees,
that they may restrict
waters within their
borders.
state ownership claims
may be "fictitious" but
they are sufficient to
support a limited
preference for a state's
own citizens.
iv.

states have acquired
additional rights to
water within their
borders due to their
continuing conservation
efforts.

c. Although the Court struck
down the reciprocity
requirement, the Court
approved of another aspect
of Nebraska law -- a
conservation restriction
that applied only to
out-of-state groundwater
-8-

exports -- notwithstanding
that it was facially
discriminatory.
d.

Court even said a complete
ban might be justifiable
in certain circumstances.

e.

Court's basic holding was,
therefore that a discriminatory law must be narrowly
drawn in terms of legitimate
objectives.

3.

El Paso decision does go further
than Sporhase, but a district
court decision is clearly not of
same significance as Supreme
Court ruling.
a.

El Paso court confined
legitimate scope of
facially-discriminatory
state restrictions on water
only to those necessary for
"health and safety" -- thus
wholly excluding sound
economic justifications.
This is considerably narrower
than Sporhase and not compelled by it.
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b.

El Paso court discounted
legitimacy of state consideration of "future"
shortages. This is also
further than Sporhase compelled.

c.

In any event, New Mexico
restrictions would not
even have passed muster
under the less harsh
Sporhase analysis because
those water laws make no
concerted effort to conserve
water for future use or
direct to most productive
use now.

B.

Still, no doubt that immediate practical effect of these decisions on
state water law is significant.
1.

Most western states have not
developed a record to justify
facially-discriminatory water
laws such as export bans and
reciprocity requirements. These
laws are now vulnerable to julicial invalidations. According
to a recent NW compilation:
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a.

At least seven western
states have absolute bans
on groundwater export:
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Wyoming.

b.

At least five other western
states have reciprocity
requirements: California,
Nebraska, Nevada, South
Dakota, and Washington.

c.

At least two other western
states have discriminatory
laws providing state agency
authority to forbid exports:
Arizona and Utah.

2.

Thus, practical upshot of
Sporhase and El Paso is that
states will now have to craft
water laws carefully, including
groundwater laws, provide for a
comprehensive conservation and
management plan that justifies
preference for in-state uses.
Notably, in Sporhase, Court found
that facially-discriminatory
groundwater conservation

requirements directed solely
at exports could survive scrutiny.
III.

Responding to Sporhase and El Paso:
Federal Legislation, Interstate Compacts,
and Better State Laws.
A. Federal legislation and risks of
congressional overreaction.
1.

It is well settled that Congress
may authorize otherwise permissible burdens on interstate compacts. See, e.g., Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408 (1946). Question of
whether and how Congress should
do so in response to Sporhase
and El Paso is a difficult
question.

2.

The broader the legislation, the
more difficult it will be to control interest groups encumbering
legislation with amendments;

3.

Extremely difficult to draft
broad language and eliminate
unintended implications, including unintentionally affecting
some areas and unintentionally
failing to affect others;
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4.

Upshot of any congressional
action would be adverse precedent of the federal government
having entered into the field of
state water allocation.

B.

Examples of current congressional
proposals.
1. Much recent activity in context
of pending coal slurry proposals.
S.1844 and H.R. 4230 in 97th
Congress and H.R. 1010 in 98th
Congress all appear to be
narrowly-drawn legislative
responses to Sporhase in the
context of providing federal
eminent domain authority to
coal slurry pipelines (copies
of pertinent provisions of all
three bills attached). Such a
narrow one-issue approach is:
a.

Less likely to have unintended consequences.

b.

Less likely to have broad
negative implications
because shows Congress
clearly intended to affect
only one particular area.
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2.

Proposal by Congressman Regula
(H.R. 1207 (copy attached)) to
sanction generally state control
of interstate transfer of waters,
including groundwaters.
a.

Language of the bill:
Sec. 2. "The regulation of
the interstate transfer of
water shall be subject to
the laws of the several
States which relate to the
regulation of the interstate
transfer of water."
Sec. 3. "No Act of Congress
pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of the United States
Constitution shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted
by any State for the purpose
of regulating the interstate transfer of water."

b.

Language of bill borrowed
from prior congressional
sanction of state regulation
of insurance approved by
Supreme Court in Prudential

Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,
supra, (4cCarran-Ferguson

Act, 15 U.S.C. §1012).
Meaning of business of
insurance, however, more
easily confined than
regulation of waters.
c.

Bill notably fails to provide exception for existing
or future federal legislation that relates to the
interstate transfer of
water (e.g., Colorado River
Basin Project, 43 U.S.C.
616aa-1 et seq., Boulder
Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. 617 et seq.).

d.

There are numerous existing
federal laws, the policies
and purposes of which could
potentially be frustrated
by state water laws governing interstate transfer.
This broad provision might
limit federal preemption
even in rare circumstances
when implicit preemption is
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legitimate (e.g., military
or national interests at
stake).
e.

Intended scope of bill
difficult to discern from
language of bill alone.
"Interstate transfer of
water" is ambiguous. It
may or may not include all
state regulation governing
acquisitions, use, or
disposition of water.

f.

This bill demonstrates
problems with overbroad
responses to Sporhase and
El Paso. At least the
potential consequences of
such a broad approach should
be carefully studied before
Congress enters the domain
of state water allocation.

3.

Proposal by Midwestern congressmen (H.R. 1749) to prohibit any
state from selling or otherwise
transferring interstate waters
located in such state for use
outside such state unless all
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states in the drainage basin
consent to such sale or transfer.
a.

No apparent constitutional
problems with proposal.

b.

This bill, however, suggests
a continuing federal supervisory role over extraterritorial diversions, arguably
inconsistent with state
primacy.

c.

Significance of this proposal is reliance on interstate compacts (discussed
further below).

B.

Benefits of Leaving Initial Responses
to the States.
1.

States are in best position to
respond to challenge of Sporhase.
a.

Western states must inventory and assess the ability
of nondiscriminatory laws
to provide adequate protection to water supplies.

b.

States could rely more on
the enactment of nondiscriminatory laws (e.g.,
Montana's declaration
that coal slurry not a
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"beneficial use" is suggestive of possibilities).
c.

States need not surrender
to the narrow reading of
Sporhase in El Paso.
1.

the Supreme Court has
explicity recognized
the propriety of
preference to in-state
uses, perhaps even
absolute bans, and
challenges the states
to demonstrate now to
the courts that their
preference for in-state
uses is necessary for
water conservation
and management.
Comprehensive groundwater planning with
concrete efforts to
address shortages
will be central to
making such a showing.
"health and safety
goals" need not be the
only legitimate basis
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for in-state preference
under Sporhase.
2.

Of course, individual state
measures will never solve all
problems of interstate allocation conflicts.

C.

The Need for Interstate Compacts.
1.

Groundwater allocation conflicts
between states do exist and
cannot be ignored. Need mechanism for dispute resolutions.

2.

Sporhase and El Paso rulings
underscore problem of interstate
allocation conflicts, but did
not create it.

3.

Existing interstate water compacts do not cover enough of the
hard allocation decisions in the
West.

4.

In present vacuum, states are
too often left with vagaries of
judicial application of federal
common law ("equitable apportionment") or unilateral congressional intervention to resolve
allocation disputes.

5.

Alternative of interstate compacts is sensible and consistent
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with the key principle of state
primacy. But development of
compacts will not be easy. It
will require hard choices and
sacrifices by states.
D.

Mechanism for Establishing Interstate
Compact.
1.

Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 of the U.S.
Constitution allows for
interstate compacts only with
congressional consent (once
consented to, compacts have
status of federal law).

2.

Congressional consent may be
given in advance or after the
fact, either explicitly or
implicitly.
Examples:
a.

Weeks Act of 1911, 16 U.S.C.
552: advance congressional
consent to interstate water
compacts generally.

b.

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1154(b): advance consent
to negotiations, but agreements not effective until
subsequently approved by
Congress.
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c.

Delaware River Basin, 75
Stat. 716: exhibits new
trend with direct federal
participation in negotiations with advance congressional consent to binding
nature of agreement reached,
including binding on U.S.
(so long as designated
federal participant in
negotiations concurs).

IV.

Several difficult legal issues remain
unanswered in the wake of Sporhase and El
Paso.
A.

Interstate compacts are based on the
premise that waters allocated to the
state are reserved to that state's
beneficial use. Does Sporhase upset
that fundamental premise?

B.

Would congressional consent to an
interstate compact demonstrate congressional approval of state
restrictions on water allocation
that would otherwise amount to
impermissible burden on commerce.

C.

Could a judicial allocation of interstate waters (through the application
of equitable apportionment) serve as
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a defense to a claim that state
restrictions on the use of those
waters violated the Commerce Clause?
D.

What is the relevance of the California
Supreme Court's recent decision in
National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, involving the
relationship of the public trust doctrine to state water rights, to state
control over interstate diversions of
waters.
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S. 1844
(97th Congress)
COAL DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION ACT OF 1982
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
Sec. 2. (a)

The Congress hereby finds and declares that--

(1) the continuing dependence of the United States on
foreign sources for petroleum and petroleum
products entails grave national security risks,
results in major balance-of-payment deficits, and
increases in inflation and unemployment in the
domestic economy;

(6)

the construction of interstate coal pipeline
distribution systems is a beneficial public use
that justifies granting the Federal power of
eminent domain to those systems for which a
findings of national interest has been made
pursuant to this Act;

(7)

State water law and interstate compacts are carefully balanced and structured systems for the
allocation of water;

(8)

the national interest is best served by developing
interstate coal pipeline distribution systems
only in the context of those State laws and interstate compacts, notwithstanding the potential
burden on interstate commerce; and

(9)

the need for a national coal distribution system
is subservient to the national interest in the
primacy of State wter law and interstate compacts
on the allocation of water.

(b) the purpose of this Act is to facilitate the development of interstate coal pipeline distribution systems
by granting the Federal power of eminent domain to
those interstate coal pipeline distribution systems
that are determined to be in the national interest:
Provided, That such development is consistent with
State water law and interstate compacts, as provided
herein.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. For purposes of this Act, the term -(1) "coal" means any of the recognized classification
of coal, including anthracite, bituminous,
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semibituminous, subbituminous, and ignite;
(2) "interstate coal pipeline distribution system"
means any pipeline system the primary economic
purpose of which is the distribution of coal in
a liquid or solid state, but in no event may the
primary purpose be the distribution of water,
whether alone or mixed with other substances-(A)

from one or more points outside a State to
one or more points within a State or between
two or more points within a State through
another State, or

(B)

from one or more points within Alaska to one
or more points in a foreign country. Such a
pipeline system shall be deemed to be in
interstate or foreign commerce if coal that
enters the pipeline system is delivered for
commercial use in a State other than Alaska
in which the coal was placed in the pipeline,
in a Territory of the United States, or in a
foreign country.

An interstate coal pipeline distribution system includes line
pipe, the right-of-way, valves, pumping stations, water supply
pipelines, and such dewatering facilities as are necessary to
delivery operations. Such systems shall not include rail, port,
highway, or other aucilliary coal-gathering or coal-storage
facilities. Access to water for the operation and maintenance
of the pipeline shall be governed by State laws and procedures
except where application of such State laws and procedures would
prohibit such access; * * *.
EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY
AUTHORITY TO MAKE NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION.
Sec. 4. (a)
--(1) Upon application of any persons proposing to
construct an interstate coal pipeline distribution
system, who has filed and secured approval of a water
permit or acquired other appropriate authorization for
preservation, appropriation, use, or diversion of
water under applicable State law as provided in section
5, the Secretary shall determine whether the construction of such system shall be in the national interest.

(e) EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY.--(1) Any person proposing
to build an interstate coal pipeline distribution system, the construction of which has been determined by
the Secretary to be in the national interest, may
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acquire rights-of-way over, under, upon, or through
private lands by exercise of the power of eminent
domain in the United States district court for the
district in which such lands are located or in the
appropriate court of the State in which such lands are
located. In any action or proceeding to acquire
rights-of-way under this section, relating to the
general eminent domain law of the State where the
property is situated, except that in the case of any
such State law, practice, or procedure, the effect of
which would prohibit any acquisition under this section,
such State law, practice, or procedure shall not be
applicable.
(2)

Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any person to acquire any right to take, use,
dispose of, or develop water through exercise of
the power of eminent domain granted under this
Act.

(3) No project constructed pursuant to the authorities
of this section shall be considered to be a
Federal project for purposes of the application
for or assignment of water rights.
PRIMACY OF STATE WATER LAW
Sec. 5.(a)

The United States or its agents, permittees,
licencees, or transferees or any interstate coal pipeline distribution system shall not reserve, appropriate,
purchase, transfer, use, divert, dedicate, or claim
water within any State for an interstate coal pipeline
distribution system, unless such reservation, appropriation, purchase, transfer, use, diversion, dedication, or claim takes place pursuant to and in compliance
with substantive and procedural law of that State relating to the control, appropriation, use, disposal, or
distribution of water and the protection and enforcement
of water rights.

(b)

Pursuant to the commerce clause in article, 1, section
8, of the United States Constitution, the Congress
declares that the establishment and exercise of terms
or conditions, including terms or conditions, on permits
or authorize interstate coal pipeline distribution system shall be determined pursuant to the law of the
State granting such permit or authorization.

(c)

Nothing in this Act shall -(1) affect in any way the validity of or preempt any
provisions of State law, regulation, or rule of
law or of any interstate compact governing the
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appropriation, purchase, transfer, use, or diversion of water;
(2)

preempt or modify any State or Federal law or interstate compact dealing with water quality or disposal;

(3)

confer upon any non-Federal entity the ability to
exercise any Federal right to the waters of any
stream or to any ground water resources; or

(4)

affect water rights of any Indian or Indian tribe
which were established by the setting aside of a
reservation by treaty, executive order, agreement
or Act of the Congress.

(d) No waters to which the Federal right can be asserted
shall be used in any interstate coal pipeline distribution system, unless authorized pursuant to an subject
to State law, the same as other water rights acquired
under subsection (a).

APPLICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
Sec. 7.

Nothing in this Act shall or in any way preempt the
applicability of any State or local law, regulation,
or rule of law pertaining to the location, construction, operation, or maintenance of an interstate coal
pipeline distribution system except where such applicability would have the effect of prohibiting the
location, construction, operation, or maintenance of
the interstate coal pipeline distribution system.

H.R. 4230
(97th Congress)
A BILL
To facilitate the transportation of coal by pipeline across
Federal and non-Federal lands.
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Coal Pipeline Act
of 1981".
FINDINGS
SEC. 2.

The Congress finds and declares that --

(I) the construction of pipelines to transport American
coal will be facilitated by granting the power of
eminent domain to certain coal pipeline carriers,
and
(2) the construction of pipelines to transport American
coal is a beneficial public use that justifies
granting the Federal power of eminent domain to
coal pipelines for which certification of public
convenience and necessity are issued under this
Act.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3.

As used in this Act --

* * * * *
(2) The term "coal pipeline" means any pipeline system
for the transportation of coal in a liquid or solid
state, whether alone or mixed with other substances,
from a point outside a State to a point within such
State or between two points in a State through
another State. A coal pipeline includes the line
pipe, valves, pumpting stations, coal collection
lines or systems, and similar equipment or facilities used or useful in the transportation of coal.

"SUBCHAPTER III--COAL PIPELINE CARRIERS
SEC. 5
110951. Eminent domain authority
"(a) Subject to the other provisions of this section, any
person holding a certificate issued under section 10952
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may acquire rights-of-way, under, upon, or through
private lands by exercise of the power of eminent domain
in the United States district court for the district in
which such lands are located or in the appropriate court
of the State in which such lands are located. The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding to
acquire right-of-way under this section in a district
court of the United States shall conform as nearly as
may be practicable with the practice and procedure in a
similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State
where the property is situated.
"(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to permit
any person (including the Commission, any other official
or employee of the United States, or any coal pipeline
carrier) to acquire any right to take, use, or develop
water through exercise of the power of eminent domain.

RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACROSS FEDERAL LANDS
SEC. 6.(a) Except as provided in this section and section 8
of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior may grant
or renew to a person holding a certificate under section
10952 of title 49, United States Code, rights-of-way
over, under, upon, or through any Federal lands for the
construction, operation, maintenance, or extension of
coal pipelines, except that in any case in which such
Federal lands are administered by the head of any other
agency, department, or instrumentality of the United
States, the Secretary of the Interior shall first consult the head of such other agency, department, or
instrumentality before granting such rights-of-way. The
Secretary of the Interior shall enter into interagency
agreements with the heads of all other agencies,
departments, or instrumentalities of the United States
administering Federal lands for the purpose of avoiding
duplication, assigning responsibility, expediting review
of applications for rights-of-way under this section,
issuing joint regulations, and assuring a decision by
such Secretary based upon a comprehensive review of all
factors involved in any application for a right-of-way
under this section. Each head of any such agency,
department, or instrumentality shall administer and
enforce the provisions of this title, appropriate regulations, and the terms and conditions of rights-of-way
granted by the Secretary of the Interior insofar as
they involve Federal lands under the jurisdiction of
such agency, department, or instrumentality.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to
any Federal lands, rights-of-way over, under, upon, or

through Federal lands for the construction, operation,
maintenance, or extension of coal pipelines for which
certificates are issued under section 10952 of title
49, United States Codes, shall be granted or renewed
after the date of enactment of this Act only as provided in this section and sections 7 and 8 of this Act.

STATE WATER LAW
SEC. 10.(a) The United States or its agents, permittees,
licensees, or transferees shall not reserve, appropriate, use, divert, dedicate, or claim water within
any State for a coal pipeline holding a certificate
issued under seciton 10952 of title 49, United States
Code, unless such reservation, appropriation, use,
diversion, dedication, or claim takes place pursuant
to State substantive and procedural law.
(b) Pursuant to the commerce clause in article I, section
8, of the United States Constitution, the Congress
declares that the establishment and gxercise of terms
or conditions, including terms or conditions terminating use, on permits or authorizations for the reservation, appropriation, use, or diversion of water for a
coal pipeline for which a certificate is issued under
section 10952 of title 49, United States Code, shall
be determined pursuant to State law notwithstanding
any transportation, use, or disposal of such water in
interstate commerce.

H.R. 1010
h
Congress,
as amended 5/3/83)
(9 8t
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Coal Pipeline
Act of 1983".

*****
"TITLE II
"FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
"Sec. 201(a)

"(6) the construction of coal pipelines is a beneficial
public use that justifies granting the Federal power
of eminent domain to those pipelines for which a finding of national interest has been made pursuant to
this Act;
"(7) State water law and interstate allocations are carefully
balanced and structured systems for the allocation of
water;
"(8) the need for coal pipelines is subservient to the
national interest in the primacy of State water law
and interstate allocations;
"(9) therefore, the national interest is best served by
developing coal pipelines only if such development is
now or hereafter permitted by those State water laws
and interstate allocations, notwithstanding the otherwise impermissible burden which may thereby be imposed
on interstate commerce;
"(b)

The purpose of this Act is to facilitate the development
of coal pipelines by granting the Federal power of
eminent domain to those coal pipelines that are determined to be in the national interest: Provided, however, That Congress declares that the development of
coal pipelines may occur only if now or hereafter permitted by State water law and interstate allocations,
and hereby delegates to and ratifies the exercise of
such authority by the States as further set forth herein.

(6) The term 'coal pipeline' means any pipeline system for
the movement of coal in a liquid or solid state, whether
alone or mixed with other substances, from a point outside a State to a point within such State or between two
points in a State through another State. A coal

- 2 pipeline includes the line pipe, valves, pumping
stations, coal collection lines or systems, and similar
equipment or facilities used or useful in the movement
of coal.

"(10) The term 'State law' includes all that body of constitutional or statutory law, judicial precedent,
administrative regulation and administrative decision,
whether now in existence or hereafter enacted, decided,
or promulgated by a State or its properly constituted
officials.
"(11) The term 'interstate allocation' means the allocation
of water between states by interstate compact or
legislative or judicial allocation.

*****
"STATE WATER LAW
"Sec. 207.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title
or any other federal law:

"(a)

Neither the United States nor any other person or
entity shall reserve, appropriate, use, divert, dedicate, export, or otherwise claim or exercise any right
or interest in, water within any State for a coal
pipeline unless such reservation, appropriation, use
diversion, dedication, export or claim takes place
pursuant to the substantive and procedural law of that
State.

"(b)

Pursuant to the commerce clause in Article I, section
8, of the United States Constitution, the Congress
hereby expressly delegates to the States the power to
estabish and exercise in State law, whether now in
existence or hereafter enacted, terms or conditions
(including terms or conditions denying or terminating
use) for the reservation, appropriation, use, export,
or diversion of or other claim to, or exercise of any
right in, water for a coal pipeline, notwithstanding
any otherwise impermissible burden which may thereby
be imposed on interstate commerce.

"(c)

Nothing in this title shall alter in any way or affect
the validity of any provision of State law, regulation,
or rule of law or of any interstate compact governing
the appropriation, use, export, or diversion of, or
other claim of right to, water, except as provided in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Nothing in
this title shall alter the rights of any State to its
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apportioned share of the waters of any body of surface
or ground water, whether determined by past or future
interstate compacts, or by past or future legislative
or judicial allocation. No State acting under the
authority of this section may restrict the importation
or movement through the State of water acquired in
another State and within a coal pipeline. Nothing in
this title shall affect water rights of any Indian or
Indian tribe. In the event of any conflict between
the provisions of this section and any other provision
of this title or other federal law, the provisions of
this section shall govern.
"EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY
"Sec. 208.(a) Subject to the other provisions of this section,
any person to whom a certification has been issued
under section 209 of this title may acquire
rights-of-way over, under, upon, or through private
lands by exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Any action shall be filed in the appropriate Court
of the state in which such lands are located by
may, upon petition of the affected landowner or
landowners, be removed to the U.S. District Court
for the District in which such lands are located.
In any such action or proceeding to acquire
rights-of-way in any State under this section,
such action or proceeding shall conform to the
laws, practices, and procedures of that State
relating to compensation, trial by jury, and
siting alternatives in the exercise of eminent
domain authority: Provided, however, That no
such State law, practice or procedure, the effect
of which would be to prohibit any acquisition for
reasons unrelated to the acquisition or use of
water rights by a coal pipeline, shall be applicable to such a proceeding unless it would allow a
reasonable alternative acquisition to occur.
"(b) Nothing in this title shall be construed to permit
any person (including the Secretary, any other
official or employee of the United States, or any
coal pipeline carrier) to acquire any right to
take, use, or develop water through exercise of
the power of eminent domain.

"CERTIFICATION
"Sec. 209.(a) Subject to the provisions of this title, a person
who has filed and secured approval of a water
permit or obtained other appropriate authority

or right for the reservation, appropriation, export,
use, or diversion of water under applicable state
law as provided in this title, may apply to the
Secretary for a certification that it is in the
national interest to construct, operate, and maintain a coal pipeline or to extend a coal pipeline
for which a certification has been issued under
this section.
"(b)(1) If the Secretary determines in writing that it is
in the national interest to construct, operate,
and maintain the coal pipeline (or, in the case
of an application for extension, that it is in the
national interest to extend the pipeline), the
Secretary shall (A) approve the application as
filed, or (B) approve the application with modifications and require compliance with such terms
and conditions as the Secretary finds necessary.

This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminor y print if the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in onler that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a Nebraska
statutory restriction on the withdrawal of ground water from
any well within Nebraska intended for use in an adjoining
State. The challenge presents three questions under the
Commerce Clause: ' (1) whether ground water is an article of
commerce and therefore subject to Congressional regulation;
(2) whether the Nebraska restriction on the interstate transfer of ground water imposes an impermissible burden on commerce; and (3) whether Congress has granted the States permission to engage in ground water regulation that otherwise
would be impermissible.
Appellants jointly own contiguous tracts of land in Chase
County, Nebraska, and Phillips County, Colorado. A well
physically located on the Nebraska tract pumps ground water
for irrigation of both the Nebraska tract and the Colorado
tract. Previous owners of the land registered the well with
JUSTICE STEVENS

'Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution provides: "The
Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . ."
For general explanations of Commerce Clause analysis, see, e. g., Western
& Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Egualizatioo, 451 U. S.
648, 652-653 (1981); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,
716 770 (1945).
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the State of Nebraska in 1971, but neither they nor the
present owners applied for the permit required by
§ 46-613.01 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. That section
provides:
"Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or
any other entity intending to withdraw ground water
from any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska and
transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to
the Department of Water Resources for a permit to do
so. li the Director of Water Resources finds that the
withdrawal of the ground water requested is reasonable,
is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the state in which the
water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw
and transport ground water from that state for use in the
State of Nebraska."
Appellee brought this action to enjoin appellants from
_ transferring the water across the border without a permit.'
The trial court rejected the defense that the statute imposed
an undue burden on interstate commerce and granted the injunction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. 208
Neb. 703, 305 N.W. 2d 614 (1981). It held that, under Nebraska law, ground water is not "a marketable item freely
transferable for value among private parties, and therefore
[is] not an article of commerce." Id., at 705, 305 N.W. 2d, at
616? The Chief Justice, while agreeing that the statutory
Because of the reciprocity requirement of 46-613.01, appellants
would not have been granted a permit had they applied for one. Their failure to submit an application therefore does not deprive them of standing to
challenge the legality of the reciprocity requirement. Cf. Larson v.
Valente, — U. S. — (1982).
'The Nebraska Supreme Court also rejected appellants' equal protection and due process challenges. Appellants renew those challenges before this Court, but we need not reach these issues in light of Our dispo-

• SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA

Ex REL. DOUGLAS

3

criteria governing the transfer of water to an adjoining State
did not violate the Commerce Clause, dissented on the narrow ground that appellee violated both the Federal and Nebraska Constitutions by attempting "to absolutely prohibit
the transfer of water, without regard to its need or availability, based soiely upon the acts of another state over which citizens of this state have no control." M., at 713, 305 N.W.
2d, at 620.
In holding that ground water is not an article of commerce,
the Nebraska Supreme Court and appellee cite as controlling
precedent Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S.
349 (1908). In that case a New Jersey statute prohibited the
interstate transfer of any surface water located within the
State.' The Hudson County Water Company nevertheless
contracted with New York City to supply one of its boroughs
with water from the Passaic River in New Jersey. The state
attorney general sought from the New Jersey courts an injunction against fulfillment of the contract. Over the water
company's objections that the statute impaired the obligation
of contract, took property without just compensation, interfered with interstate commerce, denied New York citizens
the privileges afforded New Jersey citizens, and denied New
York citizens the equal protection of the laws, the injunction
was granted. This Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
affirmed.
Most of the Court's opinion addresses the just compensation claim. Justice Holmes refused to ground the Court's
holding, as did the New Jersey state courts,' on "the more or
sition of the Commerce Clause claim.
'The Court quoted the statute: "It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or
stream of this State into any other State, for use therein." 209 U. S., at
353.
"The Courts below assumed or decided and we shall assume that the
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less attenuated residuum of tit le that the State may be said to
possees." Id., at 355. For the statute was justified as a
regulatory measure that, on balance, did not amount to a taking of property that required just compensation. Putting
aside the "problems of irrigation," the State's interest in preserving its waters was well within its police power." That
interest was not dependent on any demonstration that the
State's water resources were inadequate for present or future use. The State "finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep and
give no one a reason for its will." Id., at 357.
Having disposed of the just compensation claim, Justice
Holmes turned very briefly to the other constitutional challenges. In one paragraph, he rejected the Contract Clause
claim. In the remaining paragraph of the opinion, he rejected all the other defenses. His treatment of the Commerce Clause challenge consists of three sentences: "A man
defendant represents the rights of a riparian proprietor, and on the other
hand, that it represents no special chartered powers that give it greater
rights than those. On these assumptions the Court of Errors and Appeals
pointed out that a riparian proprietor has no right to divert waters for
more than a reasonable distance from the body of the stream or for other
than the well-known ordinary uses, and that for any purpose anywhere he
is narrowly limited in amount. It went on to infer that his only right in the
body of the stream is to have the flow continue, and that there is a residuum of public ownership in the State. It reinforced the State's rights by
the State's title to the bed of the stream where flowed by the tide, and concluded from the foregoing and other considerations that, as against the
rights of riparian owners merely as such, the State was warranted in
prohibiting the acquisition of the title to water on a larger scale." Id., at
35,1.
"The problems of irrigation have no place here. Leaving them on one
side, it appears to us that few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of
a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.'
Id., at 356.
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cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in
commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his
otherwise limited and qualified right to the same end. The
case is covered in this respect by Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U. S. 519 [(1896)1." 209 U. S., at 357.
While appellee relies upon Hudson County, appellants rest
on our summary affirmance of a three-judge district court
judgment in City of Altus v. Can, 255 F.Su pp. 828 (W.D.
Tex.), affd mem., 385 U. S. 35 (1966). The City of Altus is
located near the southern border of Oklahoma. Large population increases rendered inadequate its source of municipal
water. It consequently obtained from the owners of land in
an adjoining Texas county the contractual right to pump the
ground water underlying that land and to transport it across
the border. The Texas legislature thereafter enacted a statute that forbade the interstate exportation of ground water
without the approval of that body.' The City filed suit in
federal district court, claiming that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause.
The City relied upon West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U. S. 229 (191o), which invalidated an Oklahoma statute that
prevented the interstate tranfer of natural gas produced
within the State," and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U. S. 553 (1923), which invalidated a West Virginia statute
that accorded a preference to the citizens of that State in the
purchase of natural gas produced therein.' The Texas attorney general defended the statute on two grounds. First, he
'The district court quoted the statute: "No one shall withdraw water
from any underground source in this State for use in any other state by
drilling a well in Texas and transporting the water outside the boundaries
of the State unless the same be specifically authorized by an Act of the
Texas Legislature and thereafter as approved by it." 255 F.Supp., at 830
'Justice Holmes, the author of the Court's opinion in Hudson County,
noted his dissent. See 221 U. S., at 262.
'Justice Holmes dissented, expressing the view that the Court's decision was inconsistent with Hudson County. See 262 U. S., at 603.
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its purpose was to conserve and protect the
State's water resources by regulating the withdrawal of
ground water. The district court rejected that defense because similar conservation claims had met defeat in West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra, and Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, so prai° Second, the State argued that the statute
regulated ground water and that ground water is not an article of commerce, citing Geer v. Connecticut, supra, and Hudson County, supra. The court rejected this argument since
the statute directly regulated the interstate transportation of
water that had been pumped from the ground, and under
Texas law such water was an article of commerce. The court
then had little difficulty in concluding that the statute imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce."
asserted that

'Me district court opinion, 255 F'.Supp., at 839, included these quotation ,: from the two cases:
"The statute of Oklahoma-recognizes [natural gas] to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit it from being the subject of interstate commerce : and this is the purpose of its conservation. In other
words, the purpose of its conservation is in a sense commercial—the business welfare of the state, as coal might be, or timber. Both of these products might be limited in amount, and the same consideration of the public
welfare which would confine gas to the use of the inhabitants of a state
would confine them to the inhabitants of the state. If the states have such
power, a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its
coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals. And
why may not the products of the field be brought within the principle?"
West V. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 255 (1910).
"Another consideration advanced to the same end is that natural gas is a
natural product of the state and has become a necessity therein, that the
supply is waning and no longer sufficient to satisfy local needs and be used
abroad, and that the act is therefore a legitimate measure of conservation
in the interest of the people of the state. If the situation be as stated, it
affords no ground for the aszumption by the state of the power to regulate
interstate commerce, which is what the act attempts to do. That power is
lodged elsewhere." Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 598,
(1923).
" "Considering the statute in question only with regard to whether it
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In summarily affirming the district court in City of Altus,
we did not necessarily adopt the court's reasoning. Our affirmance indicates only our agreement with the result
reached by the district court. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 499 (1981). That result is not necessarily inconsistent with the Nebraska Supreme Court's
holding in this case. For Texas law differs significantly from
Nebraska law regarding the rights of a surface owner to
ground water that he has withdrawn. According to the district court in City of Altus, the "rule in Texas was that an
owner of land could use all of the percolating water he could
capture from the wells on his land for whatever beneficial
purposes he needed it, on or off the land, and could likewise
sell it to others for use on or off the land and outside the basin
where produced, just as he could sell any other species of
property." 255 F.Supp., at 833, n. 8. Since ground water,
once withdrawn, may be freely bought and sold in States that
follow this rule, in those States ground water is appropriately
regarded as an article of commerce. In Nebraska the surface owner has no comparable interest in ground water. As
explained by the Nebraska Supreme Court, "'the owner of
land is entitled to appropriate subterranean waters found
under his land, but he cannot extract and appropriate them in
regulates the transportation and use of water after it has been withdrawn
from a well and becomes personal property, such statute constitutes an unreasonable burden upon and interference with interstate commerce.
Moreover, on the facts of this case it appear to us that [the Texas statute]
does not have for its purpose, nor does it operate to conserve water resources of the State of Texas except in the sense that it does so for her own
benefit to the detriment of her sister States as in the case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas C. o. In the name of conservation, the statute seeks to
prohibit interstate shipments of water while indulging in the substantial
discrimination of permitting the unrestricted intrastate production and
transportation of water between points within the State, no matter how
distant; for example, from Wilbarger County to El Paso County, Texas.
Obviously, the statute had little relation to the cause of conservation."
255 F.Supp., at 819-840.

S
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a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land whkh
he owns, especially if such use is injurious to others who have
substantial rights to the waters, and lithe natural underground supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to
a reasonable proportion of the whole." 208 Neb., at 705,
305 N.W. 2d, at 617 (quoting Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124
Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933)).
City of Altus, however, is inconsistent with Hudson
County. For in the latter case the Court found Geer v.
Connecticut, supra, to be controlling on the Commerce
Clause issue. Geer, which sustained a Connecticut ban on
the interstate transportation of game birds captured in that
State, was premised on the theory that the State owned its
wild animals and therefore was free to qualify any ownership
interest it might recognize in the persons who capture them.
One such restriction is a prohibition against interstate transfer of the captured animals. This theory of public ownership
was advanced as a defense in City of Altus. The State argued that it owned all subterranean water and therefore
could recognize ownership in the surface owner who withdraws the water, but restrict that ownership to use of the
water within the State. That theory, upon which the Commerce Clause issue in Hudson County was decided, was rejected by the district court in City of Altus.'2 In expressly
overruling Geer three years ago, this Court traced the de-

excess of

"This statute, however, seeks to prohibit the production of underground water for the purpose of transporting same in interstate commerce,
and has the effect of prohibiting the interstate transportation of such water
after it has become personal property. Whether a statute by its phraseology prohibits the interstate transportation of an article of commerce after
it has become the personal property of someone as in the Pennsylvania and
West cases, or prohibits the withdrawal of such substance where the intent
is to transport such in interstate commerce, the result upon interstate commerce is the same. In both situations, the purpose and intent of the statute and the end result thereof is to prohibit the interstate transportation of
an article of commerce." Id., at 840.
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mise of the public ownership theory and definitively recast it
as "'but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource."
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 334 (1979) (quoting
Toonter v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 402 (1948)). See also Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U. S. 371,
384-387 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431
U. S. 265, 284-285 (1977). In Hughes the Court found the
State's interests insufficient to sustain a ban on the interstate
transfer of natural minnows seined from waters within the
State.
Appellee insists, however, that Nebraska water is distinguishable from other natural resources. The surface owner
who withdraws Nebraska ground water enjoys a lesser ownership interest in the water than the captor of game birds in
Connecticut or minnows in Oklahoma or ground water in
Texas, for in Geer, Hughes, and City of Altus the States permitted intrastate trade in the natural resources once they
were captured. Although appellee's greater ownership interest may not be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis, it
does not absolutely remove Nebraska ground water from
such scrutiny. For appellee's argument is still based on the
legal fiction of state ownership. The fiction is illustrated by
municipal water supply arrangements pursuant to which
ground water is withdrawn from rural areas and transferred
to urban areas. Such arrangements are permitted in Nebraska, see Metropolitan Utilities District v. Merritt Beach
Co., 173 Neb. 783, 140 N.W. 2d 626 (1966), but the Nebraska
Supreme Court distinguished them on the ground that the
transferror was only permitted to charge as a price for the
water his costs of distribution and not the value of the water
itself. 208 Neb., at 708, 305 N.W. 2d, at 618. Unless demand is greater than supply, however, this reasoning does
not distinguish minnows, the price of which presumably is derived from the costs of seining and of transporting the catch
r-
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to market. Even in cases of shortage, in which the seller of
the natural resource can demand a price that exceeds his
costs, the State's rate structure that requires the price to be
cost-justified is economically comparable to price regulation.
A State's power to regulate prices or rates has never been
thought to depend on public ownership of the controlled commodity. It would be anomalous if federal power to regulate
economic transactions in natural resources depended on the
characterization of the payment as compensation for distribution services, on the one hand, or as the price of goods, on the
other. Cf. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 558 (1891).
The second asserted distinction is that water, unlike other
natural resources, is essential for human survival. Appellee, and the amid curiae that are vitally interested in conserving and preserving scarce water resources in the arid
Western States, have convincingly demonstrated the desirability of state and local management of ground water.s
But the States' interests clearly have an interstate dimension. Although water is indeed essential for human survival,
In California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 648 (1978), we explained
some of the circumstances that support a general policy of local water management under differing legal systems:
"The very vastness of our territory as a Nation, the different times at
which it was acquired and settled, and the varying physiographic and climate regimes which obtain in its different parts have all but necessitated
the recognition of legal distinctions corresponding to these differences.
Those who first set foot in North America from ships sailing the tidal estuaries of Virginia did not confront the same problems as those who sailed
flat boats down the Ohio River in search of new sites to (ann. Those who
cleared the forests in the old Northwest Territory faced totally different
physiographic problems from those who built sod huts on the Great Plains.
The final expansion of our Nation in the 19th century into the arid lands
beyond the hundredth meridian of longitude, which had been shown on
early maps as the 'Great American Desert,' brought the participants in
that expansion face to face with the necessity for irrigation in a way that no
previous territorial expansion had."
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studies indicate that over 80% of our water supplies is used
for agricultural purposes.' The agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They provide the
archtypical example of commerce among the several States
for which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation. The multistate character of the
Ogallala aquifer—underlying appellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Kansas' s--confirms the view that there is a
significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair
allocation of this diminishing resource. Cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963).
The Western States' interests, arid their asserted superior
competence, in conserving and preserving scarce water resources are not irrelevant in the Commerce Clause inquiry.
Nor is appellee's claim to public ownership without significance. Like Congress' deference to state water law, see infra, at 16-18, these factors inform the determination whether
the burdens on commerce imposed by state ground water
regulation are reasonable or unreasonable. But appellee's
claim that Nebraska ground water is not an article of commerce goes too far: it would not only exempt Nebraska
ground water regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis,
it also would curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such regulation. See
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 621-623 (1978).
If Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas and States with similar property laws.
"Soil Conservation Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, America's Soil
and Water: Conditions and Trends 21 (1980).
"Comptroller General, Ground Water Overdrafting Must Be Controlled
7-8 (1980).
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Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Congress
has the power to deal with it on that scale.
II
Our conclusion that water is an article of commerce raises,
but does not answer, the question whether the Nebraska
statute is unconstitutional. For the existence of unexercised
federal regulatory power does not foreclose state regulation
of its water resources, of the uses of water within the State,
or indeed, of interstate commerce in water. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 766-767 (1945); United
Slates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ann., 322 U. S. 533,
548-549 (1944); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,
319 (1851). Determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce requires a more careful inquiry:
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137,
142 (1970) (citation omitted).
The only purpose that appellee advances for § 46-613.01 is
to conserve and preserve diminishing sources of ground water. The purpose is unquestionably legitimate and highly
important, and the other aspects of Nebraska's ground water regulation demonstrate that it is genuine. Appellants'
"See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 390 U. S. 179,
188 (1950) ("Insofar as conservation is concerned, the national interest and
the interest of producing states may well tend to coincide.").
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land in Nebraska is located within the boundaries of the
Upper Republican Ground Water Control Area, which was
designated as such by the Director of the Nebraska Department of Water Resources based upon a determination "that
there is an inadequate ground water supply to meet present
or reasonably foreseeable needs for beneficial use of such water supply." Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-658(1); see App. 56-60.
Pursuant to §46-666(1), the Upper Republican Natural Resources District has promulgated special rules and regulations governing ground water withdrawal and use. See
App. 61-82. The rules and regulations define as "critical"
those townships in the control area in which the annual decline of the ground water table exceeds a fixed percentage;
appellants' Nebraska tract is located within a critical township. The rules and regulations require the installation of
flow meters on every well within the control area, specify the
amount of water per acre that may be used for irrigation, and
set the spacing that is required between wells. They also
strictly limit the intrastate transfer of ground water: transfers are only permitted between lands controlled by the same
groundwater user, and all transfers must be approved by the
distict board of directors. Id., at 68-69.
The State's interest in conservation and preservation of
ground water is advanced by the first three conditions in
§46-613.01 for the withdrawal of water for an interstate
transfer. Those requirements are "that the withdrawal of
the ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to
the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare." Although Commerce Clause concerns are implicated by the fact that
§46-613.01 applies to interstate transfers but not to intrastate transfers, there are legitimate reasons for the special
treatment accorded requests to transport ground water
across state lines. Obviously, a State that imposes severe
withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not
discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to
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prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State.
An exemption for interstate transfers would be inconsistent
with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation. At least in
the area in which appellants' Nebraska tract is located, the
first three standards of §46-613.01 may well be no more
strict in application than the limitations upon intrastate
transfers imposed by the Upper Republican Natural Resources District.
Moreover, in the absence of a contrary view expressed by
Congress, we are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own
citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage. Our
reluctance stems from the "confluence of [several] realities."
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 534 (1978). First, a
State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places
of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens—and not simply the health of its economy—is at the
core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes,
we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other. See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U. S. 525, 533 (1949). Second, the legal expectation that
under cetain circumstances each State may restrict water
within its borders has been fostered over the years not only
by our equitable apportionment decrees, see, e. g., Wyoming
v. Colorado, 353 U. S. 953 (1957), but also by the negotiation
and enforcement of interstate compacts. Our law therefore
has recognized the relevance of state boundaries in the allocation of scarce water resources. Third, although appellee's
claim to public ownership of Nebraska ground water cannot
justify a total denial of federal regulatory power, it may support a limited preference for its own citizens in the utilization
of the resource. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, at 533-534.
In this regard, it is relevant that appellee's claim is logically
more substantial than claims to public ownership of other
natural resources. See supra, at 7-9. Finally, given appel-
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lee's conservation efforts, the continuing availability of
ground water in Nebraska is not simply happenstance; the
natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced
and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in
times of shortage. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429
(1980); cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 627-628 and
n. 6; Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comnen, supra. A facial
examination of the first three conditions set forth in
§ 46-613.01 does not, therefore, indicate that they impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Appellants, indeed,
seem to concede their reasonableness.
Appellants, however, do challenge the requirement that
"the state in which the water is to be used rants reciprocal
rights to withdraw and transport ground water from that
state for use in the State of Nebraska"—the reciprocity provision that troubled the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court. Because Colorado forbids the exportation of
its ground water, I1 the reciprocity provision operates as an
explicit barrier to commerce between the two States. The
State therefore bears the initial burden of demonstrating a
close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted
local purpose. Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, at 336; Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (1951).
The reciprocity requirement fails to clear this initial hurdle. For there is no evidence that this restriction is narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale.
Even though the supply of water in a particular well may be
" Cob. Rev. Stat. 37-90-136 provides as follows:
"For the purpose of aiding and preserving unto the state of Colorado and
all its citizens the use of all ground waters of this state, whether tributary
or nontributary to a natural stream, which waters are necessary for the
health and prosperity of all the citizens of the state of Colorado, and for the
growth, maintenance, and general welfare of the state, it is unlawful for
any person to divert, carry, or transport by ditches, canals, pipelines, conduits, or any other manner any of the ground waters of this state, as said
waters are in this section defined, into any other state for use therein."
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abundant, or perhaps even excessive, and even though the
most beneficial use of that water might be in another State,
such water may not be shipped into a neighboring State that
does not permit its water to be used in Nebraska. If it could
be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage,
that the intrastate transportation of water from areas of
abundance to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining
States would roughly compensate for any exportation to
those States, then the conservation and preservation purpose
might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision. A
demonstrably arid state conceivably might be able to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve water. Appellee, however,
does not claim that such evidence exists. We therefore are
not persuaded that the reciprocity requirement—when superimposed on the first three restrictions in the statute—sig
nificantly advances the State's legitimate conservation and
preservation interest; it surely is not narrowly tailored to
serve that purpose. The reciprocity requirement does not
survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially discriminatory legislation. Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, at 337.'

III
Appellee's suggestion that Congress has authorized the
States to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in ground water is not well-founded. The
suggestion is based on 37 statutes in which Congress has deferred to state water law, and on a number of interstate compacts dealing with water that have been approved by
Congress.
The reciprocity requirement cannot, of course, be justified as a response to another State's unreasonable burden on commerce. A & P Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 IT. S. 366, 379-381 (1976).
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Abstracts of the relevant sections of the 37 statutes relied
upon by appellee were submitted in connection with the
Hearings on S. 1275 before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 302410
(1964). Appellee refers the Court to that submission but
only discusses § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat.
390. That section, it turns out, is typical of the other 36 statutes. It contains two parts. The first provides that "nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to
affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation." Such language defines
the extent of the federal legislation's preemptive effect on
state law. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,
— U. S. —, — (1982); Lewis v. AT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 49 (1980). The second part provides that "the Secretary of Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws." Such language mandates that questions of water
rights that arise in relation to a federal project are to be determined in accordance with state law. See California v.
United States, 438 U. S. 645 (1978).
The interstate compacts to which appellee refers are agreements among States regarding rights to surface water. See
The Council of State Governments, Interstate Compacts and
Agencies 25-29, 31-32 (1979). Appellee emphasizes a compact between Nebraska and Colorado involving water rights
to the South Platte River, see 44 Stat. 195 (1926), and a compact among Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas involving water
rights to the Republican River, see 57 Stat. 86 (1943).
Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate Congress' deference to state water law, I9 they do not
"The history of the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States in the reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both
long and involved, but through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful
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indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to
which Congress has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal water law to govern
water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact that
Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights through mutual agreement, a) constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the
unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce.
In the instances in which we have found such consent, Congress' "intent and policy' to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause" was "expressly stated."
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, supra, at —
(quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 427
(1946)).2' Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, — U. S.
n. 21 (1982).
The reciprocity requirement of Neb. Rev. Stat. *46-613.01
violates the Commerce Clause. We leave to the state courts
the question whether the invalid portion is severable. The
judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court is reversed and
the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
and continued deference to state water law by Congress." tatifornia v.
United States, supra, at 653.
Similarly, this Court has encouraged States to resolve their water disputes through interstate compacts rather than by equitable apportionment
adjudication. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383 392 (1943).
"See, e. g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946)
(McCann Act, 59 Stat. 33(1945)); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U. S. 310 (1945) (11606(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. 1891
(1939)); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936) (Hawes-Cooper Act, 45
Stat. 1084 (1929)); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891) (Wilson Act, 26 Stat.
313 (1890)).
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JOY SPORHASE AND DELMER MOSS, ETC., APPELLANTS v. NEBRASKA, EX REL., PAUL L. DOUGLAS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA
[July 2, 1982]
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR
joins, dissenting.
The issue presented by this case, and the only issue, is
whether the existence of the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution by itself, in the absence of any action by
Congress, invalidates some or all of §46-613.01 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, which relates to groundwater.
But instead of confining its opinion to this question, the Court
first quite gratuitously undertakes to answer the question of
whether the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, conferred by the same provision of the Constitution, would enable it to legislate with respect to groundwater
overdraft in some or all of the States.
That these two questions are quite distinct leaves no room
for doubt. Congress may regulate not only the stream of
commerce itself, but activities which affect interstate commerce, including wholly intrastate activities. See, e. g.,
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942); United
States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); Houston & Texas Ry.
v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914). The activity upon
which the regulatory effect of the congressional statute fails
in many of these cases does not directly involve articles of
commerce at all. For example, in Kirschbaum, the employees were engaged in the operation and maintenance of a loft
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building in which large quantities of goods for interstate commerce were produced; no one contended that these employees themselves, or the work which they actually performed,
dealt with articles of commerce. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act were applied to them
because Congress extended the terms of the Act not only to
those who were "engaged in commerce" but to those who
were engaged "in the production of goods for commerce."
Id., at 522.
Thus, the authority of Congress under the power to regulate interstate commerce may reach a good deal further than
the mere negative impact of the Commerce Clause in the absence of any action by Congress. Upon a showing that
groundwater overdraft has a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, for example, Congress arguably could
regulate groundwater overdraft, even if groundwater is not
an "article of commerce" itself. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Red. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 281-283(1981);
id., at 310-313 (REinswisT, J., concurring in judgment);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). It is therefore
wholly unnecessary to decide whether Congress could regulate groundwater overdraft in order to decide this case; since
Congress has not undertaken such a regulation, I would leave
the determination of its validity until such time as it is necessary to decide that question.
The question actually involved in this case is whether Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 46-613.01 runs afoul of the unexercised authority
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. While the
Court apparently agrees that our equitable apportionment
decrees in cases such as Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U. S. 953
(1957), and the execution and approval of interstate compacts
apportioning water have given rise to "the legal expectation
that under certain circumstances each State may restrict water within its borders," ante, at 14, it insists on an elaborate
balancing process in which the State's "interest" is weighed
under traditional Commerce Clause analysis.
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I think that in more than one of our cases in which a State
has invoked our original jurisdiction, the unsoundness of the
Court's approach is manifest. For example, in Georgnz v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907), the Court
said:
"This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity
of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,
in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last
word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air."
Five years earlier, in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125,
142, 145-146 (1902), the Court had made clear that a State's
quasi-sovereign interest in the flow of surface and subterranean water within its borders was of the same magnitude as
its interest in pure air or healthy forests.
In my view, these cases appropriately recognize the traditional authority of a State over resources within its boundaries which are essential not only to the well-being, but often
to the very lives of its citizens. In the exercise of this authority, a State may so regulate a natural resource so as to
preclude that resource from attaining the status of an "article
of commerce" for the purposes of the negative impact of the
Commerce Clause. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that "commerce" exists in an item that cannot be reduced to possession under state law and in which the State
recognizes only a usufructuary right. "Commerce" cannot
exist in a natural resource that cannot be sold, rented,
traded, or transferred, but only used.
Of course, a State may not discriminate against interstate
commerce when it regulates even such a resource. If the
State allows indiscriminate intrastate commercial dealings in
a particular resource, it may have a difficult task proving that
an outright prohibition on interstate commercial dealings is
not such a discrimination. I had thought that this was the
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basis for this Court's decisions in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U. S. 322 (1979), Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S.
553 (1923), and West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229
(1911). In each case, the State permitted a natural resource
to be reduced to private possession, permitted an intrastate
market to exist in that resource, and either barred interstate
commerce entirely or granted its residents a commercial
preference.'
By contrast, Nebraska so regulates groundwater that it
cannot be said that the State permits any "commerce," intrastate or interstate, to exist in this natural resource. As with
almost all of the Western States, Nebraska does not recognize an absolute ownership interest in groundwater, but
grants landowners only a right to use groundwater on the
land from which it has heen extracted. Moreover, the landowner's right to use groundwater is limited. Nebraska landowners may not extract groundwater "in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land in which he owng,
especially if such use is injurious to others who have substantial rights to the waters, and if the natural underground supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a reasonable proportion of the whole." Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124
Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933). With the exception
of municipal water systems, Nebraska forbids any transpor' Similarly, in City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), affd
mem., 385 U. S. 35 (1966), Texas placed no restrictions upon the use or the
intrastate sale of groundwater. The "rule in Texas was that an owner of
land could use all of the percolating water he could capture from the wells
on his land for whatever beneficial purposes he needed it, on or off the
land, and could likewise sell it to others for use on or off the land and outside the basin where produced, just as he could sell any other species of
property." 255 F. Supp., at 833, n. 8. Texas' absolute ownership rule is
an anomaly among the Western States. See 5 R. E. Clark, Waters and
Water Rights $941 (1972 & 1978 Supp.). In Nebraska, as in most of the
Western States, groundwater is not treated as "any other species of
property."

.SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA

EX REL.

DOUGLAS

5

talon of groundwater off the land owned or controlled by the
person who has appropriated the water from its
subterrranean source. State ex. rel. Douglas v. Sporltase,
208 Neb. 703, 710, 305 N.W. 2d 614, 619 (1981). See App.
68-69.
Nebraska places additional restrictions on groundwater users within certain areas, such as the portion of appellant's
land situated in Nebraska, where the shortage of groundwater is determined to be critical. Water users in appellants'
district are permitted only to irrigate the acreage irrigated in
1977, or the average number of acres irrigated between 1972
and 1976, whichever is greater, and must obtain permission
from the water district's board before any additional acreage
may be placed under irrigation. The amount of groundwater
that may be extracted is strictly limited on an acre-inch-perirrigated acre basis. There are also detailed regulations as
to the spacing of wells and the use and operation of flow meters. App. 71-82.
Since Nebraska recognizes only a limited right to use
groundwater on land owned by the appropriator, it cannot be
said that "commerce" in groundwater exists as far as Nebraska is concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 46-613.01 either discriminates against, or "burdens," interstate commerce. Section 46-613.01 is simply a
regulation of the landowner's right to use groundwater extracted from lands he owns within Nebraska.' Unlike the
Unlike several other Western States, Nebraska does not entirely forbid groundwater extracted in Nebraska to be used in other States. See
Brief for the City of El Paso as Anticus Curiae 2, n. 3. As noted by the
Court, Nebraska merely places conditions on such a use of the State's
groundwater. A permit must be obtained from the Nebraska Department
of Water Resources. If the requested withdrawal of groundwater is determined to be "reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of
ground water, and. . . not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare," a
permit will be issued so long as the "state in which the water is to be used
grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground water from that
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Court, I cannot agree that Nebraska's limitation upon a landowner's right to extract water from his land situated in Nebraska for his own use on land he owns in an adjoining State
runs afoul of Congress' unexercised authority to regulate interstate commerce.'

state for use in the State of Nebraska." Id. § 96-613.01.
The Court today invalidates only the reciprocity provision in
§ 96-613.01. Ante, at 15-16. Appellants, however, have never applied
for the permit required by the Nebraska statute. I see nothing in the
Court's opinion that would preclude the Nebraska Department of Water
Resources from prohibiting appellants from transporting groundwater into
the Colorado portion of their land until they obtain the permit required by
the statute. I also see nothing in the Court's opinion that would preclude
the Department of Water Resources from denying appellants a permit because of a failure to satisfy the remaining conditions in the statute.

(Slip Opinion)
ROTE: Where it is feasible, a syllatme theadnute) will be released. as is
being done in connection with thie case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitute; no part of the opthion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
linifrd Steno: v. Detroit Lumber Co.. 2010 U. S. 321, 337.
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A Nebraska statute requires any person intending to withdraw ground
water from any well located in the State and transport it for use in an
adjoining State, to obtain a permit from the Nebraska Department of
Water Resour..es. If the Director of Water Resources finds that such
withdrawal is reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of
ground water, and not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he
will grant the permit if the State in which the water is to be used grzras
reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground watelefrom that
State for use in Nebraska. Appellants own contiguous tracts of land in
Nebraska and Colorado, on which a well on the Nebraska tract pumps
ground water for irrigation of both the Nebraska and Colorado tracts,
but they never applied for the permit required by the statute. Appellee
brought an action in a Nebraska state court to enjoin appellants from
transferring the water across the border without a permit. Rejecting
the defense that the statute imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, the trial court granted the injunction. The Nebraska Supreme
Court affirmed.

Held:
I. Ground water is an article of commerce and therefore subject to
congressional regulation. Pp. 3-11.
(a) Although appellee's claimed greater ownership interest in
ground water than in certain other natural resources may not be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis. it does not remove Nebraska ground
water from such scrutiny, since appellee's argument is still based on the
legal fiction of state ownership. Pp. 3-10.
(b) The States' interests in conserving and preserving scarce water
resources in the arid Western States clearly have an interstate dimension. The agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms provide the
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archtypical example of commerce among the States for which the Framers of the Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation. Here,
the multistate character of the aquifer underlying appellants tracts of
land, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas,
demonstrates that there is a significant federal interest in conservation
as well as in fair allocation of diminishing water resources. Pp. 10-11.
2. The reciprocity requirement of the Nebraska statute violates the
Commerce Clause as imposing an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. While the first three conditions set forth in the statute for
granting a permit—that the withdrawal of the ground water be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare—do not on their faces impermissibly burden interstate commerce, the reciprocity provision operates
as an explicit barrier to commerce between Nebraska and its adjoining
States. Nebraska therefore has the initial burden of demonstrating a
close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose. Such requirement, when superimposed on the first three restrictions, fails to clear this initial hurdle, since there is no evidence that it is
narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale. Thus,
it does not survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially discriminatory legislation. Pp. 12-16.
3. Congress has not granted the States permission to engage in
ground water regulation that would otherwise be impermissible. Although there are 37 federal statutes and a number of interstate compacts
demonstrating Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional restraints on
such state law. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create
a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal water
projects nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights through mutual agreement, constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral
imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. Pp. 16-18.
208 Neb. 703, 305 N. W. 2d 614, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and BREI/NAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. REIINQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CoNNoa, J.,
joined.
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To authorize the States to regulate the interstate transfer of water to insure that
Federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause does not impair or
impede the efforts of the States to protect and control this resource.
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A BILL
To authorize the States to regulate the interstate transfer of
water to insure that Federal regulation pursuant to the
commerce clause does not impair or impede the efforts of
the States to protect and control this resource.

1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That for purposes of this Act, the term "water" means stir-

4 face or ground water located in and belonging to the States.
5

SEC. 2. The regulation of the interstate transfer of

6 water shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
7 relate to the regulation of the interstate transfer of water.

2
1

SEC. S. No Act of Congress pursuant to the commerce

2 clause of the United States Constitution shall be construed to
3 invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by apy State
4 for the purposes of regulating the interstate transfer of water.
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H. R. 1749

To require the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Interior, to study the effects of interbasm water transfers on agriculture and
to prohibit any State from selling or otherwise transferring interstate waters
located in such State for use outside such State unless all States in the
drainage basin of such waters consent to such sale or transfer.

IN TEE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 1, 1983

Mr. BEDELL (for himself, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. SNITS( of Iowa, Mr.
LEACH of Iowa, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. EVANS of Iowa., Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. VENT°, Mr.
FORSYTHE, Mr. likun, and Mr. HUGHES) introduced the following bill;
which was referred jointly to the Committees on Agriculture, Interior and
Insular Affairs, and Public Works and Transportation

A BILL
To require the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Interior, to study the effects of interbasin
water transfers on agriculture and to prohibit any State
from selling or otherwise transferring interstate waters located in such State for use outside such State unless all
States in the drainage basin of such waters consent to such
sale or transfer.

1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-senta-

2 tiva of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That (a) the Congress finds that-

1

(1)r"adneqcua
itie
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2

maintain the Nation's level of agricultural productivity;

3

(2) the redistribution of water resources may ad-

4

versely affect agricultural production and the environ-

5

ment; and

6

(3) there is growing concern about the increasing

7

demands on the Nation's limited water resources.

8

(b) The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with

9 the Secretary of the Interior, shall study the effects of inter10 basin water transfers in different regions of the United States
11 on agriculture and agricultural productivity. Such study shall
12 be completed, and a report of such study shall be submitted
13 to the Congress, not later than eighteen months after the
14 date of enactment of this Act.
15

SEC. 2. No State shall sell or otherwise transfer or

16 permit the sale or transfer, for use outside of such State,
17 water which is taken from any river or other body of surface
18 water which is located in or which passes through more than
19 one State or from any aquifer or other body of ground water
20 which underlies more than one State unless21

(1) there is in effect an interstate compact (A)

22

among the States in the drainage basin of such river or

23

other body of surface water, or (B) among the States

24

under which such aquifer or other body of ground

25

water lies, which governs such sale or transfer, and
3

1
2

(2) all the States which are parties to such compact consent to such sale or transfer.
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